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I. INTRODUCTION

At present, private parties-whether individuals, entities, groups, or
organizations-possess limited rights under international law to brin
claims before an international forum for violations of international law.
In recent years, legal scholars have engaged in a spirited debate about
the desirability of using PRAs in the international context. Some
commentators-with an overly sanguine view of what law can
accomplish-have argued zealously for broader use of PRAs, perhaps
seeking to replicate the liberal 2 landscape of the American legal system
in the international arena.3 Other scholars have taken a more theoretical
1.

See DAVIDJ. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw FRAMEWORKS 78 (2001).

2. The term liberal is used here to mean liberal political theory, not ideology.
3. For sources arguing for the addition of PRAs to the WTO dispute resolution
system, see, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO-Access to the DSB System:
Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker "World Trade Court"?, 31 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 739 (2000); Glen T. Schleyer, Note, Power to the People: Allowing PrivateParties
to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275
(1997); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and ParticipationBy Nonstate
Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996); G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization,44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995); Steve Charnovitz, Participationof
Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 331 (1996). But see Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295
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approach while, nonetheless, concluding that PRAs can provide enforcement
benefits.4 Still other scholars, with an unduly dim view of the prospects
for legalized dispute resolution mechanisms, have sought to throw 5cold
water on the use of independent tribunals in the international setting.
This article seeks to chart a different course, by developing and
applying an analytical cost-benefit framework, for assessing the costs
and benefits of PRAs to enforce international law before an international
forum. This framework is drawn from various literatures. For example,
there is much to be learned about the potential benefits and costs of
PRAs in the international setting from the rich literature comparing
domestic PRAs with domestic regulation in the American context. More
broadly, the article employs a comparative institutional approach, using
a comparison between PRAs and regulatory enforcement mechanisms to
shed light on their respective costs and benefits. My overarching goal is
to develop an analytical framework that will clarify and facilitate an
assessment of PRAs, while at the same time identifying some initial
conclusions that flow from the cost-benefit analysis.6
(1996). For calls to apply or create various forms of environmental PRAs, see, e.g.,
Wynne P. Kelly, Citizens Cannot Stand for it Anymore: How the United States'
EnvironmentalActions in Afghanistan and Iraq Go Unchecked by Individuals and NonGovernmental Organizations, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 193 (2004) (exploring PRAs in
U.S. courts regarding environmental damage in Iraq and Afghanistan under domestic and
international law); Peggy Rodgers Kalas, The International Environmental Dispute
Resolution and the Needfor Access by Non-State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 191 (2001) (favorably assessing a proposal for the development of an international
environmental court); David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769 (1994); Amadeo Postiglione, An
InternationalCourt for the Environment?, 23 ENVTL. POL'Y. & L. 73 (1993) (calling for
an International Court of the Environment); Philippe J. Sands, The Environment,
Community and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 411-12, 417 (1989); David
Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in International
EnvironmentalLaw, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (1992).
4.

See LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS: A SPECIAL ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane, and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, eds., 2000) (the special issue begins at 54 INT'L ORG. 385) [hereinafter
LEGALIZATION]; Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Laurence R. Heifer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posnerand Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, JudicialIndependence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and
Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REV. 957 (2005).
6. Elsewhere, I have used this framework of costs and benefits to conduct a
comparative institutional analysis of PRAs and other international enforcement
mechanisms. See, Philip M. Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of

Many of the costs and benefits of PRAs involve two related factors:
independence and discretion. The presence of PRAs in enforcement
mechanisms increases the independence of that mechanism from state
control and at the same time reduces the ability of the mechanism to
exercise discretion in enforcement. Another set of related characteristics
is centralization and decentralization. Enforcement mechanisms that are
regulatory in nature are centralized, whereas enforcement mechanisms
that incorporate PRAs are decentralized. Variation in all of these
characteristics results in different benefits and costs for enforcement
mechanisms.
The most important benefit of independent PRAs is the potential for
increased enforcement of international rules, which could help realize
greater benefits from those rules and from international agreements.
Independent PRAs can also provide credible commitments guaranteeing
state obligations. Reducing discretion in enforcement can help to avoid
mutual non-enforcement of rules by states and potential capture of
enforcement mechanisms by private interests.
In addition, PRAs may have some efficiency benefits. Private plaintiffs
may have greater immediate incentives to pursue violations than, say,
enforcers in an enforcement bureaucracy. In some contexts, moreover,
private plaintiffs will have informational advantages over regulatory
enforcers or states. In a business context, for example, the victim is
likely to know the identity of the violator, or may be familiar with the
nature of the harm, or the particular market involved.
PRAs can impose "sovereignty costs" because increased enforcement
constrains state action. As a result, states may resist compliance, or may
balk at becoming a party to a regime that features PRAs. The lack of
prosecutorial discretion inherent in PRA mechanisms can also impose
various costs. For example, in some situations, a cooperative approachrequiring the exercise of discretion-may be more successful than an
adversarial approach. Reduced discretion may also reduce flexibility in
the enforcement of rules, rendering them brittle and reducing the
possibility of efficient breach. The decentralized nature of enforcement
under PRAs, moreover, could result in repetition of effort and lack of
strategic direction.
Finally, PRAs essentially shift international law-making from states to
private parties and judicial bodies, or other decision-making mechanisms.
Perhaps this is not an issue if private interests are better able to represent

International Regimes 79 TEMPLE L. REv. (forthcoming 2006); Philip M. Moremen,
Costs and Benefits ofAdding a PrivateRight of Action to the World Trade Organization
and the Montreal Protocol Dispute Resolution Systems, 11 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. (forthcoming 2006).
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the collective interests of individuals than states. Nonetheless, the
existence of these and other potential costs suggest that PRAs are not
unquestionably desirable. The balance of costs and benefits will depend on
the institutional design of the particular mechanism and the context in
which it operates-and how PRAs stack up against competing
alternatives.
II.

DEFINITIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

This section sets out certain definitions and basic concepts to provide
a background for further analysis. Because this article concentrates on a
comparison between PRAs and regulatory enforcement mechanisms, this
section will define those mechanisms and will describe their operation in
the international context. The section also explores the different functions
of PRAs and regulation.
A. Regulatory Enforcement and PrivateEnforcement
1. Stages of Enforcement
There are at least two stages in private and regulatory enforcement: an
initiation stage and an adjudication stage.7 The initiating and the adjudicating
8
functions may be conducted by the same body, or by different bodies.
The two functions may be combined in atypical ways, mixing elements of
both private and regulatory mechanisms. Indeed, comparing models
of private enforcement and regulatory enforcement is one way to think
about the possible mix of actors who engage in initiation and
adjudication.

7. See generally John Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International
Environmental Law, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2001) (assessing the effectiveness of
enforcement mechanisms by focusing on differences in the process of review initiation
and types of review body); Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational,54 INT'L ORG.
457 (2000) (in assessing legalized international dispute resolution mechanisms, the
authors implicitly recognize the distinction).
8. In regulatory enforcement, there may be so much overlap between initiation
and adjudication that there may be a third stage. That is, there are a number of
enforcement actions and decisions that a regulatory enforcement body may take short of
formal adjudication that require an application of law to facts and a determination of
responsibility.

2. Regulatory Enforcement
Domestic regulation is defined as "the public administrative policing of a
private activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest." 9
Domestic regulatory enforcement can apply a range of persuasive and
coercive tactics. At the informal end of the spectrum government
inspectors may simply encourage a regulated entity to comply with the
law. At the formal end of the spectrum, regulatory enforcement can
include the application of administrative penalties, civil suit, or even
criminal prosecution. The ability of public enforcers to apply civil or
criminal penalties provides them with leverage they can use to compel
regulated entities to cooperate short of taking formal action-public
enforcers operate in the shadow of the law. 10
Various international bodies-commissions, secreatriats, prosecutorsengage in administrative or regulatory action, 1 including regulatory
enforcement. Enforcement can involve monitoring and verification,
investigation, prosecution, internal adjudication, or prosecution before
a separate, independent body. At the aggressive end of the spectrum are
the European Commission and the Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Court, entities that perform enforcement functions akin to those
of domestic regulatory bodies.
In regulatory enforcement, an enforcement body investigates and
pursues violations of the relevant rules. The enforcement body-as
opposed to private parties-has the primary authority to initiate
enforcement action. The enforcement body may submit matters for
adjudication to an internal administrative body, 12 or it may refer
enforcement matters for adjudication to an external tribunal. 13

9.

Barry M. Mitnick, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATIONS: CREATING,
7 (1980).
10. See Lewis Kornhauser & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
11. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of
DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS

Global Administrative Law 5-6, liLJ Working Paper 2004/1 (2004), available at http://www.
iilj.org/papers/2004/documents/2004. 1KingsburyKrischStewart.pdf, revised version reprinted

at 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2005, at 15, 17-18 (specifying rule-making,
administrative adjudication, and other forms of decision and management, including
informal decisions).
12. This is the approach under the International Labor Organization (ILO) regular
system of supervision, or the Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure.
13. For example, the European Commission and the Prosecutor of International
Criminal Court refer matters to the European Court of Justice and the International
Criminal Court, respectively.
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3. PrivateEnforcement
The essential distinction between public and private enforcement of
public law is the identity of the enforcer, or the initiator of action. In
private enforcement, private citizens or entities are the primary enforcers,
relying only on the public officials in the judicial system. 14 Whereas
there is usually only one public enforcer, it is possible for there to be a
number of private enforcers.
Private enforcement tends to be identified with the use of independent
courts or tribunals as the adjudication mechanism, especially in the
domestic context. While this may be the dominant arrangement, there is
no inevitable link between private initiation or enforcement and courts.
Indeed, in the international context, bodies that seem more regulatory in
nature may carry out adjudication connected with PRAs. That is, they
consist of commissions, secretariats, or similar bodies that are more
subject to political control than independent adjudicators. Under the
NAFTA environmental side agreement, for example, an administrative
body accepts private submissions regarding state violations, which it
investigates and assesses, supervised by a political body. The initiator is
private, but the adjudicator seems more like a regulatory body.
This article focuses on enforcement by private parties through formal
enforcement mechanisms. A PRA at the international level could involve a
complaint before an international forum, or administrative review board,
when a state has failed to implement its international obligation or has
failed to enforce it. Private parties can consist of individuals, businesses,
or other kinds of private groups.
a. Personaland Public PRAs
A distinction exists between private enforcement by victims and
private enforcement by non-victim private parties. I will call suits by
victims "personal PRAs" and suits by non-victims "public PRAs."
Personal PRAs belong to individuals, permitting a remedy for harm done
to them that also harms the public good. Public PRAs, in contrast, may
be brought by one or more plaintiffs on behalf of the public generally,
regardless of whether they have suffered injury as a result of the defendant's
action. In reality, both types overlap, but it is useful for analytical

14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367 (4th ed., 1992)
(distinction between common law method of regulating and public regulation).

purposes to keep them distinct. International PRAs could be personal or
public.
The main distinctions between personal and public PRAs relate to the
standing of plaintiffs and the incentives they provide to plaintiffs. As for
standing, in personal PRAs, only the victim of wrongdoing has the
right to bring a claim. Under public PRAs, anyone can bring a claim
on a "first-come, first-served" basis.
As for incentives, the incentives in personal PRAs can include not
only a potential financial judgment, but also retribution and deterrence.15
The motivation in public PRAs may be financial, as a plaintiff may be
able to obtain a monetary judgment or a bounty. The motivation may
also be ideological, in the sense that a favorable judgment may further
the ideological agenda of a private plaintiff, such as a non-governmental
organization.
III. COMPARISON OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRAS

The development of the cost-benefit framework is informed by the
method of comparative institutional cost-benefit analysis.' 6 Comparative
institutional analysis emphasizes the necessity of comparison in assessing
institutions because no institution is perfect; an institution's costs and
benefits can only be understood in comparison to alternatives.
Accordingly, this article sets the cost-benefit analysis in the context of a
comparison between PRAs and regulatory enforcement mechanisms.' 7

15.

See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. L. &
255, 266-67 (1993).
16. The article follows an approach to comparative institutional analysis drawn
from the New Institutional Economics. This particular approach was developed by Neil
Komesar and Joel Trachtman, among others. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOosING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EcoNoMiCs, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994);
Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the InternationalEconomic
Organization; Toward ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470
(1996-1997) [hereinafter Trachtman, Theory of the Firm]; Edward L. Rubin, The New
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). This approach pays particular attention to transaction costs
and to costs of interest group influence over the operations of institutions. Thus, comparative
institutional analysis draws on public choice and other interest group theories. These
interest group theories assert that narrow interest groups within society can greatly
influence government administration, including public enforcement activities, thereby
"capturing" these political processes.
17. There are several reasons to focus on PRAs and regulatory enforcement
mechanisms. First, comparing PRAs with regulatory enforcement mechanisms helps us
to compare enforcement with private participation and enforcement without. Second, the
costs and benefits of each are, in many respects, complementary. Finally, these two
mechanisms are the most direct analogues to PRAs and regulatory enforcement in the
United States, and it may be helpful to apply insights from literature about the domestic
analogues to the international context.
ECON.
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This comparison generates some of the cost-benefit factors and helps to
illustrate the application of others. Additional comparisons will be made
with the existing predominant international enforcement mechanism:
state-to-state dispute resolution.1 8
The article refers to several literatures in identifying particular costs
and benefits of enforcement mechanisms. Comparative institutional
analysis emphasizes the role of interest group influence on institutions
and the importance of transaction costs. American legal scholars have
compared PRAs and regulatory enforcement mechanisms in the United
States. Particularly useful in this regard is the law and economics literature.
Scholars in international law and international relations, moreover, have
Finally, literature
addressed compliance with international norms.
regarding the enforcement of both domestic and international rules has
proposed useful models for different approaches to enforcement.1 9 The
enforcement model calls for strict application of rules and imposition of
sanctions. The managerial approach prescribes cooperative measures,
such as financial assistance, combined with the application of persuasion
and coercion.
The cost-benefit analysis consists of a qualitative assessment of
factors, in many ways common to traditional legal interest balancing-it
is not a quantitative assessment. The analysis proceeds primarily by
analyzing logical groupings of associated costs and benefits, often
reciprocal, rather than assessing benefits together and then costs together.
For example, one great disadvantage of the discretion available in
regulatory enforcement is the potential for capture, yet the availability of
regulatory discretion provides a number of benefits that are lost when
discretion is curtailed.

18. State-to-state dispute resolution is the default approach to international
enforcement. The costs and benefits of state-to-state dispute resolution are much the same as
the costs of regulatory enforcement, except in degree. This is because the benefits and
costs of both regulatory enforcement and state-to-state dispute resolution largely derive
from the availability of prosecutorial discretion and of political control over dispute
resolution. In contrast, the benefits and costs of PRAs relate primarily to the comparative
independence of PRA mechanisms from political influence and from the unavailability
of discretion. On a continuum, regulatory enforcement lies between PRAs and state-tostate dispute resolution in its degree of political control/independence and availability of
discretion.

19.

See

ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY

(1995); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News
About Compliance GoodNews About Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).

A. IncreasedConstraintand the Optimal Level of Enforcement
The balance of costs and benefits imposed on states by enforcement
mechanisms will be termed "constraint. '20 Constraint means the influence,
pressure, or restraining force that particular enforcement mechanisms
bring to bear on the behavior of target entities, either national governments
or individuals. Constraint can consist of attractive pressures or inducements
as well as negative pressures. 21
The main potential advantage of PRAs-and the one most cited by
proponents-is that they can increase the level of enforcement of
international law rules, or the level of constraint applied by the enforcement
mechanism. Increased enforcement may lead to greater compliance by states
with rules and agreements, therefore increasing the benefits of cooperation.
The increased number of private enforcers compared to regulation (so
the logic goes) increases monitoring, and thus increases the probability
of detection and the imposition of sanction. This may be particularly
true on the international plane, where regulatory capacity is'thin and
states may refrain from making claims against one another. Increased
enforcement may be a benefit of PRAs, but, as explored below, in certain
circumstances it may not be a benefit, or may be countered by significant
costs. Furthermore, it may make better sense to increase enforcement
through other institutional means, such as regulatory enforcement.
B. Discretion Versus IncreasedLegalization
1. In General
A potential advantage of regulatory enforcement is the availability of
greater discretion in regulation than in private enforcement. Enforcement
bodies can apply a wide range of discretion in making enforcement
decisions and often have a wide variety of enforcement options-ranging
from informal investigation to referral to an adjudicatory body. At the
adjudication phase of enforcement, there may be more discretion in an
20. This approach applies a rational choice view of state behavior. Under rational
actor models, "states and the individuals that guide them are rational self-interested
actors that calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action .. " Oona

Hathaway, Do Human Rights TreatiesMake A Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (2002).
21. A significant international relations literature has developed in the last ten
years regarding the effectiveness and legalization of international dispute resolution
mechanisms. Several authors have developed similar models or typologies of these
mechanisms, identifying the factors that contribute to their effectiveness. See Keohane,
et al., supra note 7; Karen J. Alter, Regime Design Matters: Designing International
Legal Systems for Maximum or Minimum Effectiveness, (paper presented at International
Studies Association Conference, Mar. 14-16, 2000) (Version 1.1, Mar. 7, 2000; on file
with the author); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4.
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internal regulatory adjudication than in a judicial one. For the private
enforcer, on the other hand, the window for the operation of discretion is
narrower. While there may be opportunities to exert pressure for settlement,
there are fewer enforcement options, usually limited to a decision to
make a claim in the first place. In addition, when there are numerous
potential plaintiffs, the exercise of overall discretion is impossible: one
plaintiffs exercise of discretion to desist can be trumped by another
plaintiff's decision to proceed. There is competition in enforcement.
Among the potential benefits of discretion, described in more detail
below, is greater enforcement effectiveness in some contexts and greater
flexibility. The disadvantage of discretion is the increased possibility of
capture, shirking, and mutual non-enforcement. PRAs necessarily render
the application of agency discretion impossible. Should an agency decide not
to prosecute a particular violation, private parties can step in and do so.
As a result, implementation of a coherent enforcement policy-designed
to maximize enforcement and social cost-will be impossible and societal
resources as a whole may be squandered. Furthermore, enforcement
under PRAs will become much more legalistic and much less flexible,
which may not be the most effective enforcement strategy.
2. Advantages of Discretion
a. Efficient Breach
The concept of efficient breach suggests that, in some cases, despite a
clear breach of obligation, flexibility in holding parties to their obligations
makes sense from an efficiency perspective. That is, society might
permit, or even encourage, breach of contract where the benefit to
society of allowing the breach exceeds the harm caused by the breach.
In WTO law, for example, an acceptance of efficient breach in certain
circumstances is demonstrated by GATT's escape clause.22
In these cases, maximum compliance or enforcement is not desirable.
PRAs for individual claimants could void the benefits of an efficient
breach approach because individual plaintiffs will have no incentive to
desist in appropriate cases. The notion of efficient breach may be more
applicable in some circumstances than in others, however. For example,
we might be less willing to accept efficient breach in the enforcement of

22. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a "Safeguard":A Positive Analysis of the
GA TT "Escape Clause " With Normative Speculations,58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1991).

jus cogens23 norms, which have an absolute character. In the economic
sphere-as under the WTO regime-efficient breach may be more
attractive.
b. Compliance Advantages
In domestic enforcement, scholars have identified differences between
a deterrence approach and a compliance approach to enforcement.24 The
deterrence approach relies on detection and punishment of violators to
deter violations. This approach tends to rely on formal legal process as
its primary tool. The compliance approach, in contrast, attempts to
prevent violations and remedy underlying problems through cooperation.
The compliance approach emphasizes the role of negotiation in the
relationship between the enforcer and the violator. Most violations are
resolved through negotiated settlement rather than through official legal
action, although enforcers can take advantage of the shadow of the law
to induce agreement. The compliance approach tends to operate in the
context of an on-going relationship between regulators and the regulated
community, where both sides have an incentive to preserve the ongoing
cooperative relationship and to avoid the costs of formal enforcement.
Thus, among the ostensible advantages of a compliance approach is
increased cooperation in compliance on the part of the regulated
community.
Regulatory enforcement tends to operate on the compliance end of the
spectrum, though it can take a harder, deterrent approach. PRAs, in
contrast, operate on the deterrence end of the spectrum. The deterrence
approach embodied in PRAs leaves less room for negotiation and
persuasion, although settlement is always possible. Instead, PRAs invoke
the formal legal process, taking an adversarial approach in which the
opportunities for negotiation and persuasion may be diminished. Because
there is less likely to be an on-going relationship between private enforcers
and their targets-and so less chance than in regulatory enforcement for
repeat interactions-there may be less incentive to settle disputes.
23. Jus cogens norms are norms that are so significant that they invalidate norms
created by treaty or custom. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 62-63 (4th ed., 2003).
24. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory
Bureaucracies, in KEITH HAWKINS & JOHN M. THOMAS, ENFORCING REGULATION 3, 13

(1984). See also KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT (1984); Raymond
J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance with State Environmental
Regulations, 12 J. POLICY ANALYSIS & MNGMT. 753 (1993) (surveying literature regarding

deterrence and compliance approaches); David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance
Happens and Doesn't Happen Domestically, in EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD K.
JACOBSON, ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 19, 27-30 (1998).
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In the international context, the compliance and deterrence approaches
have been recast as the enforcement and managerial schools of enforcement. 25
The enforcement approach emphasizes the necessity for sanctions to
compel states. The managerial approach relies more on bargaining with
violators, on applying diplomatic pressure, and on providing assistance to
enable violators to comply. These two approaches can also be seen as a
reflection of John Jackson's conception of a continuum between pragmatic
26
and legalistic dispute settlement, or politics and law, in international trade.
In the international context, negotiation and persuasion may be more
important tools than in the domestic context. This is because constraint
or enforcement levels normally available in international law are thin.
Accordingly, of necessity, the goals and tactics of enforcers may have to
be less coercive and more persuasive.
c. Efficiency in Enforcement
Another advantage of discretion may be conservation of prosecutorial
resources. Though most applicable in domestic enforcement, this concern
may carry over to the international context. Negotiation and persuasion
saves the costs of actual, formal prosecution, while discretion allows
prosecutors to choose the most significant cases and ignore the less
significant. In fact, there may be several reasons why a decision not to
pursue a violation would be appropriate, such as when a violation is
relatively minor, when a particular violator has a good compliance
record in the past, or when a settlement for a lesser penalty will conserve
resources. Private enforcers may not see the broader picture, possibly
focusing on discrete violations and immediate incentives rather than on
generalized compliance over time.
d. PRAs Take ControlAway From States
Both PRAs and a developed regulatory body could take control away
from states in a number of ways. PRAs are more likely to do so because
a regulatory body would be more likely to answer to states, due to state
influence over the process. States would lose control of enforcement
decisions, including the prosecutorial discretion to bring suits, because

19.

25.

See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 19; Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note

26.

JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-111 (2nd ed., 1997).

private parties could bring suits states decline to bring. States would
also lose the ability
to settle• the suits they do bring, 27
because private
•
parties could recommence suits that states chose to drop. Accordingly,
informal accommodation between states through persuasion and negotiation
will be difficult.
Most importantly, providing private parties with the right to bring
claims would give private parties an agenda-setting role in litigation,
which would essentially provide them with a law-making role. 28 The
legal decisions emerging from adjudication will create precedent that
can have legal effect. 29 In the domestic context, the legislature can
simply engage in legislative reversal by addressing an unwelcome
precedent. In the international context, however, legislation-treaty
revision and amendment-is particularly difficult and relatively rare.
Nevertheless, it may be that adjudication meets a demand for lawmaking in the international context that otherwise would not be met.
The question of whether states or private parties should control the
dispute settlement agenda raises issues of comparative legitimacy and
accountability of government and of private interests, discussed further
below.
e. Flexibility
Flexibility allows states to adapt to circumstances as they change,
which is particularly useful since treaties are difficult to amend.3 ° In
addition, the existence of this kind of flexibility may entice states to
enter into stronger commitments, knowing that there is potentially an
27. Where multiple persons have rights to litigate the same matter, settlement or
diplomatic compromise will be made more difficult. See Clifford G Holderness, Standing, 3
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 505 (1998). "When standing

is granted to an open or amorphous class, by definition it will be impossible to contract
with all class members." Id. at 506.
28. See Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private
Participationin WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 221, 238-239 (2003) (discussion of deterrence and compliance models). Alternatively,
adjudication may usurp the legislative right of "inertia." See Frieder Roessler, Are Judicial
Organs Overburdened, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM, 308 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).

29. The traditional international law rule is that international decisions do not
create binding precedent for other parties and other cases, but international tribunals
refer all the time to their own earlier decisions and to the decisions of other courts. See,
e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, art. 38, 59, 33 UNTS
993 (decisions of the ICJ have no binding force except between the parties regarding the
particular case, but decisions of international courts are a subsidiary means of determining
international law).
30. See John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes, Questions and Comparisons, in
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 457, 462 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds.,
1997).
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escape valve. Flexibility may allow states to maintain compliance with
the spirit of an agreement, or with parts of an agreement, while allowing
some divergence. Escape clauses, or equivalent features, may allow a
regime to bend, rather than break. Examples of these types of features
include the escape clause in GATT and a clause in the European
Convention on Human Rights allowing for specified suspensions of
rights in time of public emergency. 3'
3. Disadvantagesof Discretion
On the other hand, of course, too much flexibility can reduce the value
of state commitments and reduce the incentives or disincentives for
compliance. Those in the deterrence camp argue that the compliance
approach is not rigorous enough, allowing too many violations to go
unpunished and weakening overall deterrence. Other related disadvantages
of the compliance approach are the enhanced possibility of capture and
the lack of transparency. Adding PRAs to the mix, either in conjunction
with regulation or as a stand-alone mechanism, may help to avoid these
disadvantages.
a. Capture and Shirking
A potential benefit of PRAs is counteracting capture of regulatory
enforcement processes by special interests. This article accepts the
proposition of the interest group theories that there exists a potential for
Capture of bureaucratic
bureaucratic capture by private interests.
agencies occurs when well-organized private interest groups influence
the decisions of the regulatory bodies designed to oversee them. Thus,
regulators will favor better-organized interests, such as business interests,
over more diffuse interests, such as environmental interests.32
PRAs might also mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with
regulatory enforcement, such as shirking or opportunistic behavior.
Because bureaucrats are rational self-interest maximizers, they will
attempt to satisfy their preferences when possible, even when those
preferences diverge from social preferences. It would be extremely
difficult to identify accurately the nature and extent of those preferences,
31.

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental

Freedoms, openedfor signatureApr. 11, 1950, § 1, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S 222.
32.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).

however. There are various theories-often contradictory-regarding
the general nature of bureaucrats' preferences, including the various
interest group theories asserting the likelihood of government capture.33
We may merely be able to say that that bureaucrats will sometimes seek
to maximize their own divergent preferences at the expense of their
agency's mission.
Where public enforcers fail to enforce the law because of capture or
shirking, private enforcers can make an end-run around public enforcers
to enforce the law directly. As a result, not only is capture rendered
ineffective, but the competition from private enforcers conceivably
could encourage or shame public enforcers to be more aggressive.
Furthermore, PRAs could also create political pressure for increased
political oversight of enforcement.
b. Captureand Mutual Non-enforcement at the InternationalLevel
PRAs in international enforcement processes could ameliorate
capture, as well as the related problem of mutual non-enforcement by
states. A public choice analysis suggests that interest groups could have
some influence on international regulatory bodies and international
enforcement processes more generally, including state-to-state dispute
resolution systems.34 Because the actions of national politicians and
international bureaucrats are more obscured from the scrutiny of domestic
citizens than in the domestic context, they may be more susceptible to
special interests. Where international enforcement mechanisms are
undeveloped and there is little bureaucracy, however, capture is obviously
not yet a problem.
More to the point, states may, in a sense, capture state-to-state dispute
resolution processes through mutual non-enforcement. That is, states
may enter into tit-for-tat deals not to enforce particular international
rules.35 Indeed, states may be unwilling to enforce international rules
more generally, because they do not wish to have international rules
33.

For a survey of theories of bureaucratic behavior, see Mark A. Cohen,

Monitoring andEnforcement of EnvironmentalPolicy, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS: 1999/2000: A SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES
44, 51-55 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 1999). These theories include Niskanen's
bureaucratic behavior theory, which asserts that bureaucrats are driven to enhance their
agencies' budgets in order to derive such benefits as higher salaries, perks, and stature.
Another approach holds that bureaucratic enforcers are motivated not to maximize social
welfare, but to maximize compliance with the law. Under another theory, the median
voter model, legislators enact strong laws that voters want, but because voters cannot
observe enforcement, government enforcement of those laws is less stringent.
34. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking:
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 J. INT'L L. Bus. 681 (1996-1997).
35. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 28, at 240-41.
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enforced against them. All of these forms of mutual non-enforcement
undermine the integrity of the international rules at issue and may leave
individual rights unprotected.
C. Independence in Adjudication
Like regulators, judges and other adjudicators can be analyzed as
agents of a principal, the lawgiver.36 In the international context, the
lawgiver consists primarily, though not exclusively, of states. Some
accounts assume that judges always faithfully apply the rules proscribed
by the lawgiver, or, the lawgiver's intent. 37 But, like regulators and
other political actors, judges may have their own agendas and face
incentives that encourage disloyalty.
Scholars have developed several theoretical approaches to the roles of
judges in the domestic American legal system and have conducted
empirical analyses. The various theories often conflict. The empirical
analyses suggest some conclusions, but are often inconclusive or
contradictory, and tend to support aspects of several theoretical
approaches.3" Accordingly, it is hard to determine how the various
incentives will effect judges.
Certainly, however, judges will not always be faithful agents and their
disloyalty can result in various costs. Where judges are not independent,
they are less likely to apply the rules of regime in a good faith manner, if
at all. Even where judges are relatively independent, they may still decide
to shirk, or otherwise not apply the rules of a regime. Alternatively, as
discussed more fully below, judges may decide to use their discretion to
develop the law in ways that are inimical to the interests of states. When
this legal development makes the regime more constraining, the resulting
sovereignty costs on states could result in backlash against the regime.

36. See generally Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-The
Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333 (2002).
37. See id. at 333.
38. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship:JudicialDecision Making and the New Empiricism U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 833
(2002); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
JudicialBehavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 615 (2000). Heise and Schauer provide brief

surveys of these schools and the literature. The various theoretical approaches can be
identified as behavioralism, attitudinalism, a legal model, public choice, and institutionalism.
The attitudinal approach has the most empirical support and dominates the literature.
See Heise, supra note 38, at 833. Attitudinal approaches focus on the judge's ideology
as an influence on judicial decisions.

Examples of independent legal development by tribunals include the
European Court of Justice's development of European Community law
and the NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals' development of regulatory
takings rules.39
D. PRAs as Credible Commitments
To make their commitments more credible, parties to a contract may
take certain steps to impose checks on their freedom of action or to
impose costs on themselves if they violate those commitments. 40 An
historical example is the exchange of hostages to guarantee a truce
agreement. The establishment of PRAs by governments or states can be
considered just such a credible commitment.
That is, placing some enforcement responsibility in the hands of third
parties to an agreement can serve as a guarantee that the rules will be
enforced. This may be particularly important in the international
context, as states are notoriously reluctant to enforce international rules.
Such credible commitments can also reassure states parties about the
intentions of their partners, thus discouraging anticipatory defections. In
the trade and investment contexts, moreover, credible commitments can
reassure private business that states are less likely to change the legal
rules governing these activities.
E. Sovereignty Costs
A cost of more legalized and constraining international compliance
processes-and PRAs may serve to increase legalization and constrain
significantly the impact on state sovereignty. 4' Abbot and Snidal
characterize this impact as "sovereignty costs," 42 and their analysis
39. See Alan 0. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of InternationalEconomic
Law: Of Standing and Remedy, 34 J.LEGAL STuD. 631 (2005) (decrying the development
of regulatory takings rules by the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals).
40. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 16770 (1996) (discussing the concept applied to contracts and firms); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 335-36 (1996) (discussing the application of the
concept to political institutions).
41. See Kenneth W. Abbott, et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401,
416 (2000) (The extent to which individuals and private groups can initiate a legal
proceeding is a significant variable in legalization). The more legalized a mechanism is,
the "harder" it becomes, applying greater levels of constraint. Hard legalization in general
imposes high sovereignty costs, "especially the classic legal model with centralized
judicial institutions capable of amplifying the terms of agreements in the course of
resolving disputes." Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hardand Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 439 (2000).
42. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 41, at 436-441. Of course, definitions of sovereignty
are highly variable and subject to disagreement. For present purposes, it is not necessary
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provides a useful framework. Sovereignty costs include (1) the potential
for inferior outcomes on particular issues, (2) the loss of authority over
decision making in an issue area, and (3) fundamental encroachments on
areas of state sovereignty.
First, sovereignty costs attach when states make legal commitments
that limit their behavior in particular circumstances-leading to less
favorable outcomes on short term issues. States may often find these
costs to be acceptable because the outcomes achieved by the relevant
agreements outweigh the costs. Second, sovereignty costs exist when
states accept the operation of external authority in decision making on
significant issues. This external authority can take the form of requiring
changes in domestic laws, or can take the form of substituting international
actors in decision making processes. Objections to the "faceless bureaucrats"
in the WTO dispute resolution
process are a typical domestic reaction to
43
this type of sovereignty CoSt.
Finally, high sovereignty costs exist when international agreements
intervene between a state and its citizens or territory, or interfere in
activities or attributes that are seen as closely related to perceived core
functions of government. The operation of international human rights
regimes or questions of national security may impose this type of
sovereignty cost. Other examples might include easing border restrictions
and free trade rules that limit discretion on labor, safety, or environmental
regulations. 4
Sovereignty costs to states are particularly significant to the ultimate
success of compliance mechanisms and the regimes they serve.
Sovereignty costs affect states' willingness to join a regime to begin
with and to continue complying with the regime's rules or decisions
once they have joined.45 Where sovereignty costs reach particularly high

to posit a precise definition of sovereignty, as the important point is that states "often
perceive international legalization as infringing on state sovereignty, broadly construed."
Id. at 437 n.47.
43. See id. at 437.
44. Of course, there are also issues where sovereignty costs are low, as in the area
of technical standards. There, state interests are more closely aligned and the nature of
cooperation often involves simple coordination of policies.
45. See Abbot & Snidal, supra note 41, at 436. See also David G. Victor, The
Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, in
THE

IMPLEMENTATION

AND

EFFECTIVENESS

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

COMMITMENTS 137, 166 (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds.,
1998), citing Patrick Szdll, The Development of MultilateralMechanisms for Monitoring

levels, states may be willing to defect altogether. The benefits of the
regime may need to be correspondingly high to counteract such costs, as
in, for example, the WTO.4 6
F. Efficiency Issues
1. Private PartyIncentives In General
The successful operation of a system of private rights of action
depends upon "getting the prices right" to induce private regulators to
engage in socially optimal behavior. It is likely that, in a system of private
enforcement-especially one involving public PRAs-the private
incentives for enforcement will not easily align with social incentives.
Accordingly, when these private incentives are misaligned, there may be
costs to society, either of underenforcement or overenforcement. In addition,
society's relative lack of control over private party enforcers will make it
difficult to bring private incentives in line with social incentives. The
nature of the incentives facing private parties is more significant than the
nature of the incentives facing public regulators because private enforcement
depends entirely on a structure of incentives to operate.
Insights regarding the nature of incentives facing private enforcers
derive from a varied economic literature regarding enforcement, mostly
in the domestic context. Accordingly, the following analysis will concentrate
first on the analysis in the domestic context and then on the international
arena. In the case of personal PRAs, private enforcers possess significant
incentives for pursuing their claims, including, for example, the potential
financial gains of a court judgment, the ability to stop current harm or to
deter future harm, and the desire for retribution. Another motivation
might be to hobble a business competitor. In the case of public PRAs, it
is usually necessary to provide some sort of reward, or for there to be
some other type of incentive for a private party to act. Sometimes an
ideological motive can serve this purpose.
2. ContextualFactorsthat Affect Incentives
There are certain contexts in which the incentives favor personal
PRAs, on the one hand, or regulation or public PRAs, on the other.4 7 For
example, in cases involving actual harm, the victim may have certain
Compliance, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (Winfried
Lang ed., 1995).
46. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 41, at 439.
47. Public PRAs or regulation are often appropriate alternatives in the same
circumstances. The choice between public PRAs and regulation must be evaluated on
the basis of other cost-benefit factors.
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informational advantages that render a personal PRA most efficient. In a
business context, a victim is likely to appreciate the extent of the harm
and the nature of the relevant market better than a third party or a public
enforcer. Most importantly, the victim is likely to know the identity of

the rule-breaker, for example, in common-law tort or contract cases. In
to pursue the violator because
these cases, it makes sense for the victim
48
the costs of investigation are negligible.
Where some investigation must be undertaken to identify a violator,
regulation or public PRAs may be more effective. 49 Regulatory enforcers

will have the advantage of greater resources to locate violators.
Situations in which the perpetrator is not easily identified include
criminal violations, violations of regulatory5° rules designed to prevent

harm, and, sometimes, environmental cases.

3. Incentives, Overenforcement, and Underenforcement
a. The Economically Efficient or OptimalLevel of Enforcement
Economic analysts of enforcement in the domestic context5 ' have adopted
Economic
a theoretical model of the optimal level of enforcement.5
theorists use the model to predict what would happen to the level of
48. It is not surprising, then, say law and economics scholars, that the U.S. legal
system leaves enforcement of torts and breaches of contract to private enforcement by
victims. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 34 (1975).

49. See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. L. &
ECON. 255, 268-69 (1993).
50. See id. at 266-67. A similar analysis distinguishes between centralized
(government operated) "police patrols" and decentralized (privately operated) "fire
alarms." See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 Loy. L.S.
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 389 (2004); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus FireAlarms, 28 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 165 (1984); Christina R. Sevilla, A Political Economy Model of GATT/WTO
Trade Complaints (Working Paper, 1996) (on file with the author). Police patrols
attempt to maintain general surveillance of the regulated community to detect violations.
Fire alarms rely on a system of rules and procedures that allow decentralized private
parties to detect violations and make complaints. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra, at
172.
51. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, supra note 48;
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105
(1980); Shavell, supra note 49.
52. A 1968 article by Gary Becker on the economic analysis of crime is the
seminal article in this area. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J.POL. EcON. 169 (1968).

enforcement in various circumstances, for example, to examine how
strictly private enforcement would affect the overall level of enforcement.
Although it would be operationally impossible to actually know the
optimal level of enforcement, the theorists examine the extent to which
reality conforms to the model.5 3
In this model, overall social welfare in the case of harmful acts can be
expressed as the sum of the gains individuals obtain from committing
5 4
harmful acts, less the harms caused, and less the costs of law enforcement.
The socially optimal sanction as expressed in a fine, therefore, will equal
the value of the social harm5 5 divided by the probability of imposing the
penalty. The penalty would be optimal because an individual would
commit a harmful act only if the gain he would derive from it would
exceed the harm he would cause, taking into account the likelihood of
being caught. That is, deterrence is a function of both the magnitude of
the sanction and the probability of imposing the penalty.
The function of enforcement, then, is to choose a mix of policies that
will maximize social welfare in this sense by adequately (but not overly)
deterring potential lawbreakers. 6 This leads to an "efficient" level of
law breaking. Most law breaking is punished, but a small level of
violations is tolerated, under the model, when the benefits of those
violations exceed the social cost. The model may explain why we do not
see perfect enforcement of rules in reality. Less than absolute enforcement
of the speed limit by traffic police is a perfect example of this dynamic
in action: the social harm created by the marginal increase in speed is
offset by the cost of stopping all who minimally exceed the limit.

53.

See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 49, at 255 (the "basic questions about the

observed structure of law enforcement can be answered by reference to the theoretically
optimal structure of enforcement; the actual pattern of enforcement seems to be broadly
consistent with the pattern that is most effective in theory.").
54. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS

1661, 1747-48 (Alan J.Auerbach & Martin Feldstein, eds., 2002).

55. Because the analysis is a theoretical model, it is not affected by the precise
definition of harm adopted. Nevertheless, harm can be defined as the consequence of an
act falling in a socially undesirable category of consequences. Harm usually means
physical injury or damage to property, but could, in principle, extend to any consequence
said to be harmful, including indirect effects. Id.
56. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 57.
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b. Implicationsfor Private Enforcement Compared
to Regulatory Enforcement
58
57
Using this model of enforcement, law and economics scholars
generally contend that private enforcement tends toward over or underenforcement, in that private and social incentives to find liable parties
can be misaligned.59 Private parties may have a socially inadequate
motive to pursue liable parties, resulting in under-enforcement, or they
may have too much of an incentive, resulting in over-enforcement.
Misalignment costs of private enforcement may be significant.
Landes and Posner argue that private parties using public PRAs may
have an incentive to over-litigate. 60 Laws are written in an over-inclusive
way and private party enforcement would lead to fuller enforcement of
those laws than public enforcement. Regulation is over-inclusive because it
is less costly for legislators to write over-inclusive regulations than to
tailor a rule precisely to every potential application. Public prosecutors
61
can employ discretion, thereby reducing the costs of over-inclusion,
62
consistent.
as
or
but private enforcers may not be as restrained
As discussed above, this economic analysis is theoretical and cannot
be applied to real situations. In addition, it assumes that regulatory
enforcement is more likely to approach the social optimum, which is not
clear. Still, public enforcement levels are more easily subject to change
or control. The real question in a comparative institutional analysis,
increased enforcement is desirable in spite of the
moreover, is whether
63

increased costs.

57. The economic model is designed to assess a private enforcement system in
which private enforcers operate competitively on a first-come, first-served basis and
compare it with regulatory enforcement. That is, the model focuses, essentially, on a
system of public PRAs, so that its conclusions about misincentives largely apply to
public PRAs. Nevertheless, personal PRAs can exhibit misincentive problems as well,
following similar logic. See Shavell, supra note 49, at 269-70.
58. Becker and Stigler, however, argued early on that private competitive
enforcement of fines could achieve the same socially optimal level of enforcement as
public enforcement, potentially at less cost. Becker & Stigler, supra note 51.
59. See Shavell, supra note 49, at 269.
60. See Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 34.
61. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 600.
62. Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 38-41.
63. Even if there are costs associated with the incentive structure of private
enforcement, that does not establish a case for preferring public enforcement. Landes
and Posner themselves make this point. Id. at 15-16. Other benefits or costs associated with
either mechanism could trump the ostensible efficiency losses of private enforcement.

To recap, the costs of private party enforcement related to incentives
are twofold. First, there is the potential for misalignment of private
incentives with social incentives, however measured. Second, there is a
comparative lack of control on the part of society over private enforcers,
complicating efforts to bring those private incentives in line with social
incentives.
c. Incentives of Ideologically Motivated Plaintiffs
A wild card is the role of advocacy groups and NGOs in private
enforcement. This is because the ideological motivation of advocacy
groups provides a non-monetary incentive to bring enforcement suits
that may be difficult to assess. Advocacy group participation in a
private enforcement system could lead to increased overall enforcement
activity and potential overenforcement. On the other hand, enforcement
could be inadequate in some cases where the incentive is insufficient or
where litigation cost is significant. For example, NGOs may have a
small window to participate in the Montreal Protocol non-compliance
procedure's
review of state implementation, but have not sought to do
SO64

so. 6

Various monetary incentives and costs, including fluctuating transaction
costs, can also shape the actions of advocacy groups in ways that may
not be socially optimal. Increases or decreases in litigation costs could
affect the willingness and ability of NGOs to bring suit, because of the
limited resources available to them. 65 This cost sensitivity may not only
determine the volume of suits, but also may lead groups to bring claims
under certain laws and not others, or to bring claims against certain
defendants and not others.66
d. Theory Applied to the InternationalRealm
Although it may be difficult to analyze the extent to which reliance on
international PRAs would lead to misalignment of private and social
incentives for enforcement, we may be able to come to some rough
conclusions. Most importantly, private parties do not necessarily receive a
direct monetary award, especially in the case of public PRAs. In some
64. See Victor, supra note 45, at 153-54.
65. Cohen, supra note 33, at 91.
66. See id.; Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law, 68 LAND ECON. 28, 46-47 (1992). For example, more environmental
citizens' suits have been filed under the Clean Water Act in the United States than under
other federal statutes. This is probably because the Act requires polluters to submit
detailed monitoring reports, which disclose pollution violations to the public. Citizens
can then use these reports as the basis for their claims.
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cases, incentives could be ideological, with NGO plaintiffs responding to
the possibility of exposing violators and increasing the application of
penalties. Incentives for businesses could relate to competitive pressures, a
significant incentive.
Underenforcement may be an issue where non-monetary incentives
are inadequate. The possibility of over-enforcement seems remote because
the level of enforcement of international rules is extremely low already.
Nevertheless, if states really desire a low level of enforcement of
international rules, PRAs could lead to over-enforcement compared to
that standard. As in the domestic context, moreover, there would exist a
lack of control over private parties. This would result in an inability to
adjust or direct private party action in a centralized way to approach a
social optimum level of enforcement, however defined.
As for an assessment of the incentives of states in state-to-state dispute
resolution, states may have the level of incentives most close to optimal,
67
because they are enforcing the rights for which they have bargained.
As we have seen above, however, states may not be actually willing to
enforce their rights because of the incentives for discretionary nonenforcement. We could view this underenforcement as optimal-states
get what they want-or we could view it as an issue of skewed
incentives or misincentives.
4. Incentives, CoordinatedEnforcement, Specialization,
and Economies of Scale
An advantage for PRAs in general is the efficiency gain resulting from
the availability of high incentives available to private enforcers. Private
enforcers have an incentive not only to pursue their claims, they also
have an incentive to reduce costs. The low incentives faced by regulatory
enforcers could lead to less vigorous enforcement and to less costeffective enforcement. As discussed above, however, these high incentives
for private enforcement may cause behavior that does not coincide with
68
social goals, or that may even result in shirking or cheating.
The coordinated enforcement associated with regulation has a number
of advantages over the uncoordinated enforcement that would prevail in
67.
68.

Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 28, at 243.
This issue can be seen as an agency problem-private party agents diverge

from their public principal's goals-or it can be seen as a "probity hazard," as
Williamson calls it. See Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies:A
Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 321-24.

a private enforcement market. Most importantly, coordinated enforcement
can eliminate duplication of prosecutorial efforts. In addition, as described
above, enforcement agencies can exercise prosecutorial discretion and
act strategically in determining how to proceed. Another advantage of
regulation is that regulatory agencies are able to take advantage of
economies of scale and often have access to a wide variety of resources
and special skills. In a sense, these attributes of enforcement agencies
may be thought of as natural monopolies.69
G. Set-up Costs and OperationalCosts
1. Set-up Costs and OperationalCosts
The costs of setting up and operating enforcement mechanisms are
additional costs. Set-up costs, of course, are largely one-time capital
costs. Because of set-up costs, existing mechanisms, or adaptations of
them, may be preferred over the establishment of new mechanisms, all
other things being equal. 70 The creation of private rights of action or
regulatory enforcement mechanisms at the international level may
require the establishment of new or expanded institutions that could
entail significant set-up costs.
2. Cost-shifting
One advantage of PRAs, from the point of view of their political
creators, is that private parties bear the cost of prosecution, rather than
the government. Of course, this is not a cost savings to society as a
whole, but rather a cost shift. In the international sphere, this costshifting effect may be appealing to states because states may be reluctant
to spend money to create international bureaucracies. The initial appeal,
however, may wear off, as states discover that PRAs may impose more
constraint on their action than would an international bureaucracy.
H. Successful PrivateParties
Under public choice and collective action theories, multinational
corporations or other well-funded private interests may be able to
69. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 49, at 270 ("[t]he best technologies for finding
liable parties often require coordination of many individuals, sometimes on a vast scale.
Additionally, it is efficient for various information systems.., to be developed, even
though the benefits of these systems would be hard for the private sector fully to capture.
Such information systems, as well as certain other enforcement technologies, may
constitute natural monopolies .... ").
70. Oliver E. Williamson, The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and
Inefficiency, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 195 (1996).
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organize for litigation more effectively than public interests, whether at
the domestic or the international level. For example, in the trade context
-were PRAs to be added to the WTO dispute resolution procedureproducer interests might predominate over consumer or environmental
interests. PRAs may not, therefore, ultimately provide an advantage to
NGOs.
I. Legitimacy
NGOs are major plaintiffs in many existing international PRA
mechanisms and will play an equivalent role in many future mechanisms.
Most of the time, NGOs act as private attorneys general, enforcing rules
ostensibly for the public good. Accordingly, the participation of NGOs
in enforcement mechanisms raises several issues related to the concept
of legitimacy. Among these are issues of democratic legitimacy,
accountability, and procedural legitimacy.
A complete examination of these topics would raise issues of political
theory and would require examination of various extensive literatures,
both of which are tasks that are well beyond the scope of this article.7 2
Much of the discussion regarding the legitimacy of NGOs, moreover, is
normative and indeterminate.
For example, different parties make
normative claims about their relative democratic legitimacy that often
cancel each other out, or are difficult to assess. In the WTO context,
businesses may argue that their government does not adequately
represent economic interests, constrained as it is by the influence of
NGOs or by short-term political considerations. NGOs often argue that
the government is failing to protect environmental, labor, or human
rights standards, perhaps at the behest of business interests.
Nonetheless, this section will consider some relevant concerns, focusing
on democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy means that the extent of
the democratic nature of a governance mechanism determines the

71.

See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 28, at 247-48.

72.

For discussion of legitimacy in the legal literature, see, e.g., Daniel M.

Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Environmental Law in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (forthcoming 2007), available at SSRN Paper

Collection, http://ssm.com/abstract-899988; Paul B. Stephan, The New International
Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS (1990).

legitimacy of its political authority. 73

Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane

identify two basic alternative conceptions of democratic legitimacy, both
of which provide bases for assessing the legitimacy of particular
mechanisms. 74 Under the participation conception, each person has an
equal say in collective decision-making; full participation is the ideal.
Legitimate public power serves the interests of the people as a whole,
which means that outcomes reflect what individuals desire.75 Under the
delegation conception, power is legitimate only when authorized by the
consent of those who delegate it, and only as long as it operates within
the given authority.7 6 The obvious extreme archetypes for both of these
models are direct democracy and representative democracy, respectively.
In terms of the delegation conception, NGOs have not been delegated
law-making authority by anyone. 77 From the point of view of the
participation conception, NGOs may have a better claim to democratic
legitimacy, in that NGOs represent a group of like-minded people
participating in law-making. The basic question, however, should be a
comparative one: do states or NGOs best promote the interests of the
people as a whole? At least in the case of representative democracies, it
seems more likely that states will better realize collective preferences
than NGOs with narrow agendas. Governments are a mechanism for
78
reconciling the demands of different interests and of their populations.
NGOs, in contrast, represent only a sub-section of the broader society.
Perhaps, however, we should examine the democratic legitimacy of
entire PRA mechanisms, not just NGOs. In other words, we might see a
PRA mechanism as a competition between interest groups participating
in the system, resulting in a representative decision for international
society as a whole. Perhaps interest groups would counteract one another,
in a sort of international transplantation of the (particularly American)
liberal model of competing interest groups.7 9
73. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1, 2 (1999).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 4.
77. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, International Law Versus the American
Constitution--Something's Got To Give, NAT'L INT., Spring 1999, at 30. Nonetheless,
even non-conservatives who generally approve of the role of NGOs in international
policy-making express concern about legitimacy and accountability issues. See, e.g.,
Peter J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations:
AccountingforNGOs, 3 CHI. J.INT'L L. 161 (2002).
78. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 28, at 228.
79. See Benedict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal
Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of
InternationalCivil Society, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183, 185-86 (2002) (the inspiration for the
role of NGOs in international civil society is "the global application of liberal principles
akin to those associated in the Untied States with the First Amendment. NGOs operating
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Transposition of an interest group competition model to the international
environment presents difficulties, however. 80 The domestic context contains
many checks-government, numerous adverse interest groups, the
press-that simply do not exist to the same extent in the institutionally thin
international context. Accordingly, the effects of bias toward particular
interest groups will be more pronounced in an international litigation
system that has significant lawmaking effect. Furthermore, the operation of
an interest group competition model means that all interest groups would
have a role. There is, then, little reasonable ground for objecting to
businesses as private plaintiffs under NAFTA Chapter 11, for example.
Accordingly, NGO participation in PRAs--essentially in international
lawmaking-is difficult to justify as legitimate in a democratic sense,
especially compared to (democratic) governments. Lack of democratic
legitimacy does not mean, however, that NGOs are completely unaccountable
for their actions. They are accountable in a sense to their members and
to other international actors, including their peer organizations. 81 It is
necessary to weigh a lack of democratic legitimacy also against the
instrumental value of PRAs, which depends for effectiveness on the
participation of private actors with incentives to make claims.
In addition, private party participation may increase the perception of
procedural legitimacy-the sense that an institution "operates in accordance
with generally accepted principles of right process.' 82 Private party
participation may improve transparency, which may also enhance
procedural legitimacy. To the extent that procedures are viewed as
legitimate, they may exert a "compliance pull' '83 that enhances compliance
with the operation of those procedures.

internationally are attracted by the notion in U.S. public law that anyone should be free
to from a group,.., and to advocate through it virtually any nonviolent political or moral
position.").
80. But see Spiro, supra note 77; Paul Wapner, The DemocraticAccountability of
Non-GovernmentalOrganizations:Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.

197 (2002). Spiro and Wapner argue increased NGO competition can solve some of the
accountability problems of international NGOs.
81. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 73, at 10. See also Wapner, supra note 80;
Spiro, supra note 77.
82.

See FRANCK, supra note 72, at 24.

83.

Id.at 24-25.

IV. CONCLUSION

The most significant benefit of international PRAs is the potential for
enhanced enforcement of international law, which could help realize
greater benefits from cooperation. Second, international PRAs could
serve to counteract the tendency of states to engage in a tit-for-tat
relaxation of enforcement of international norms. Finally, PRAs can
serve as a commitment device for states.
The disadvantages of PRAs mirror their primary advantages. Increased
enforcement can impose sovereignty costs, which may lead states to
resist compliance with an international regime, or to resist joining a
regime. In addition, legalized enforcement through PRAs reduces the
discretion and flexibility of enforcement, which can be a disadvantage in
several ways.
Prosecutorial discretion permits a cooperative approach to enforcement,
which may be more effective in achieving compliance in some circumstances
than an adversarial approach. Prosecutorial discretion allows enforcers
to take advantage of situations that call for efficient breach. Flexibility
may also preserve the integrity of the rules, where the pressure that
would result from compelled compliance might otherwise lead to defection
of states.
Allowing private parties to initiate claims would also decentralize
enforcement because of repetitive litigation, lack of strategic
direction, and reduced economies of scale. Decentralized enforcement
can be less efficient, with more repetition of effort, fewer economies of
scale, and less strategic direction. Decentralized enforcement can also
make settlement of disputes more difficult. More importantly, decentralized
enforcement through PRAs would provide private parties, tribunals,
and judges a greater law-making role in international society, at the
expense of political decision-making by governments.
Therefore, although there are potential benefits to PRAs, there are also
potential costs that can be significant. The balance of costs and benefits
will depend on the design of the specific enforcement mechanism
involved, on the institution in which it is embedded, and on the political
interests of states. The question is not whether PRAs in general are good
or bad, but whether they make sense in particular contexts. The trick is
designing mechanisms that have a positive balance of costs and benefits.
A more profound difficulty is that states are still largely in charge of
creating international enforcement mechanisms in the first place. In
designing regimes, why should states be keen to abandon mechanisms
over which they retain a degree of control? Nevertheless, in some
circumstances, states will prefer the advantages of credible commitments
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and more constraining arrangements, or will be pressured into such
arrangements by international or domestic political concerns. In these
circumstances, international regulatory enforcement, designed carefully,
could serve as a palatable option.
The disadvantage of international regulatory enforcement for states is the
development of international bureaucracies that may impose significant
sovereignty costs and monetary costs. PRAs, while appearing less
expensive in the short run, however, have the potential in the long-run to
impose much greater sovereignty costs. A more general disadvantage
may be the possibility that states will design PRA mechanisms that appear
constraining, but that do not really overcome the problems of regulatory
mechanisms.
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